The end

This was my first blog and I appreciated to make it a lot. This was a work for my english class and I have to say that I was not very enjoyed at the beginning.. It was a new type of work and I thought it could be very more complicated because my work would be read on Internet.

Now I think that this work permitted me to be more careful on my english language, and I believe I progressed with this. I chose a subject which interested me, and I think I tried to give several points of view of homosexuality. I don't have time to speak about homosexual wedding and adoption, but I will do this later, or I will let you, my readers, to think about it and to defend their own opinion around you.

I hope this blog is attractiv for you and that you learnt some things about homosexuality. I tried to give you some aspects of this social issue but I never tell you my own opinion. In my opinion homosexuality is only a problem of ideology and of minds. When people will be ready to see that the couple composed by one man and one woman is not the only one which exists and which can exist, different people will be accepted, and maybe one day homosexual people will be accepted everywhere (but it is not for tomorrow, even in France which is a developped country!!!). I think that nowadays we cannot exclude people for them sexual attractions, skin's color or religion. But it is only my point of view and my blog is here to help you to have your own opinion.

I think blogging experience is a good thing for class work, and oblige us to have another approach of a subject which can concern a lot of people in the world.

So I must tell good bye, and see you soon bu the way of your comments…


May 21, 2006 at 3:19 pm 2 comments

Some grammar points


Modal verbs are special verbs which behave very differently from normal verbs.

They don't take a "-s" in the third person and they cannot be used in the past and future tenses.

Some modals :



  • To show the superiority :
    adjective + -er + than when the adjective has only one syllable
    more + adjective + than for the the other cases
    ex : He is older than his sister.
    This car is more expensive than the other.
  • To show the inferiority :
    less + adjective + than
  • To show the equality :
    as + adjective + as

Present perfect

Has/have + past participle We have to use present perfect in specified moment :

  • when the action happened at an unspecified time before now, 
  • to show that some action began in the past and has continued up until now.

Some prepositions

A preposition describes a relationship between other words in a sentence.

ex :
in front of

May 3, 2006 at 8:44 pm Leave a comment

Vocabulary about Legal status of homosexuality in France

Liable (adj.): legally, responsible

To range (v.): to extend

Consent (n.): permission, approval

Scourge (n.): bane, curse

Nevertheless (adv.): on the other hand, however

To trigger (v.): to activate, to generate

To reach (v.): to attain, to get in touch with

To withdraw (v.): to remove, to take out

To rescind (v.): to withdraw

Endorsed (adj.): authorized, legitimate

May 3, 2006 at 7:35 pm Leave a comment

Vocabulary of the article about Natural law

Realm (n.): kingdom, area

To underpin (v.): to add force to, to fortify

Harsh (adj.): severe, ≠ gentle

Hence (adv.): consequently, for this reason

Emphasis (n.): accent, importance

Upon (adv.): in the lead, ≠ losing

To shape (v.): to influence, to affect

To embody (v.): to represent

Mainstream (adj.): typical, ≠ unconventional

To outline (n.): to draw, to delineate

Above (prep.): exceeding, ≠ below

Dismissive (adj.): unconcerned, indifferent

Pursuit (n.): activity, interest

Length (n.): extent

Bounds (n.): limits

Offspring (n.): progeny, children

Requirement (n.): condition, necessity

Due to (prep.): because of, by reason of

To forbid (v.): to prohibit, to prevent

Broad (adj.): wide, extensive

Sharp (adj.): quick, ≠ blunt

Self (n.): nature, identity

Mere (adj.): simple

To detract from (v.): to decrease

Fulfillment (n.): execution, achievement

To waver (v.): to hesitate, to be irresolute

Spouse (n.): partner, other half

May 1, 2006 at 8:42 pm Leave a comment

The case of France

To see in particular the case of my country, go to the following website :

April 12, 2006 at 11:14 pm 1 comment

What about Homophobia?

Homophobia is the fear of homosexuality or Homosexuals. This term now extends to discrimination against homosexual people, and the hatered towards them.
People, who are frightened, often fear that other people would think they are homosexuals or that a homosexual person could be attracted by them. Attack is for some people the best system of defense.
Homophobia, like all forms of racism, can create violence against people of the homosexual community.

April 12, 2006 at 11:05 pm 1 comment

Article about Natural Law

Today natural law theory offers the most common intellectual defense for differential treatment of gays and lesbians, and as such it merits attention. The development of natural law is a long and very complicated story, but a reasonable place to begin is with the dialogues of Plato, for this is where some of the central ideas are first articulated, and, significantly enough, are immediately applied to the sexual domain. For the Sophists, the human world is a realm of convention and change, rather than of unchanging moral truth. Plato, in contrast, argued that unchanging truths underpin the flux of the material world. Reality, including eternal moral truths, is a matter of phusis. Even though there is clearly a great degree of variety in conventions from one city to another (something ancient Greeks became increasingly aware of), there is still an unwritten standard, or law, that humans should live under. In the Laws, Plato applies the idea of a fixed, natural law to sex, and takes a much harsher line than he does in the Symposium or the Phraedrus. In Book One he writes about how opposite-sex sex acts cause pleasure by nature, while same-sex sexuality is “unnatural” (636c). In Book Eight, the Athenian speaker considers how to have legislation banning homosexual acts, masturbation, and illegitimate procreative sex widely accepted. He then states that this law is according to nature (838-839d). Probably the best way of understanding Plato's discussion here is in the context of his overall concerns with the appetitive part of the soul and how best to control it. Plato clearly sees same-sex passions as especially strong, and hence particularly problematic, although in the Symposium that erotic attraction could be the catalyst for a life of philosophy, rather than base sensuality (Cf. Dover, 1989, 153-170; Nussbaum, 1999, esp. chapter 12). Other figures played important roles in the development of natural law theory. Aristotle, with his emphasis upon reason as the distinctive human function, and the Stoics, with their emphasis upon human beings as a part of the natural order of the cosmos, both helped to shape the natural law perspective which says that “True law is right reason in agreement with nature,” as Cicero put it. Aristotle, in his approach, did allow for change to occur according to nature, and therefore the way that natural law is embodied could itself change with time, which was an idea Aquinas later incorporated into his own natural law theory. Aristotle did not write extensively about sexual issues, since he was less concerned with the appetites than Plato. Probably the best reconstruction of his views places him in mainstream Greek society as outlined above; the main issue is that of active versus a passive role, with only the latter problematic for those who either are or will become citizens. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was, according to his contemporaries, only attracted to men, and his thought had no prohibitions against same-sex sexuality. In contrast, Cicero, a later Stoic, was dismissive about sexuality in general, with some harsher remarks towards same-sex pursuits (Cicero, 1966, 407-415). The most influential formulation of natural law theory was made by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Integrating an Aristotelian approach with Christian theology, Aquinas emphasized the centrality of certain human goods, including marriage and procreation. While Aquinas did not write much about same-sex sexual relations, he did write at length about various sex acts as sins. For Aquinas, sexuality that was within the bounds of marriage and which helped to further what he saw as the distinctive goods of marriage, mainly love, companionship, and legitimate offspring, was permissible, and even good. Aquinas did not argue that procreation was a necessary part of moral or just sex; married couples could enjoy sex without the motive of having children, and sex in marriages where one or both partners is sterile (perhaps because the woman is postmenopausal) is also potentially just (given a motive of expressing love). So far Aquinas' view actually need not rule out homosexual sex. For example, a Thomist could embrace same-sex marriage, and then apply the same reasoning, simply seeing the couple as a reproductively sterile, yet still fully loving and companionate union. Aquinas, in a significant move, adds a requirement that for any given sex act to be moral it must be of a generative kind. The only way that this can be achieved is via vaginal intercourse. That is, since only the emission of semen in a vagina can result in natural reproduction, only sex acts of that type are generative, even if a given sex act does not lead to reproduction, and even if it is impossible due to infertility. The consequence of this addition is to rule out the possibility, of course, that homosexual sex could ever be moral (even if done within a loving marriage), in addition to forbidding any non-vaginal sex for opposite-sex married couples. What is the justification for this important addition? This question is made all the more pressing in that Aquinas does allow that how broad moral rules apply to individuals may vary considerably, since the nature of persons also varies to some extent. That is, since Aquinas allows that individual natures vary, one could simply argue that one is, by nature, emotionally and physically attracted to persons of one's own gender, and hence to pursue same-sex relationships is ‘natural’ (Sullivan, 1995). Unfortunately, Aquinas does not spell out a justification for this generative requirement. More recent natural law theorists, however, have tried a couple different lines of defense for Aquinas' ‘generative type’ requirement. The first is that sex acts that involve either homosexuality, heterosexual sodomy, or which use contraception, frustrate the purpose of the sex organs, which is reproductive. This argument, often called the ‘perverted faculty argument’, is perhaps implicit in Aquinas. It has, however, come in for sharp attack (see Weitham, 1997), and the best recent defenders of a Thomistic natural law approach are attempting to move beyond it (e.g., George, 1999, dismisses the argument). If their arguments fail, of course, they must allow that some homosexual sex acts are morally permissible (even positively good), although they would still have resources with which to argue against casual gay (and straight) sex. Although the specifics of the second sort of argument offered by various contemporary natural law theorists vary, the common elements are strong (Finnis, 1994; George, 1999). As Thomists, their argument rests largely upon an account of human goods. The two most important for the argument against homosexual sex (though not against homosexuality as an orientation which is not acted upon, and hence in this they follow official Catholic doctrine; see George, 1999, ch.15) are personal integration and marriage. Personal integration, in this view, is the idea that humans, as agents, need to have integration between their intentions as agents and their embodied selves. Thus, to use one's or another's body as a mere means to one's own pleasure, as they argue happens with masturbation, causes ‘dis-integration’ of the self. That is, one's intention then is just to use a body (one's own or another's) as a mere means to the end of pleasure, and this detracts from personal integration. Yet one could easily reply that two persons of the same sex engaging in sexual union does not necessarily imply any sort of ‘use’ of the other as a mere means to one's own pleasure. Hence, natural law theorists respond that sexual union in the context of the realization of marriage as an important human good is the only permissible expression of sexuality. Yet this argument requires drawing how marriage is an important good in a very particular way, since it puts procreation at the center of marriage as its “natural fulfillment” (George, 1999, 168). Natural law theorists, if they want to support their objection to homosexual sex, have to emphasize procreation. If, for example, they were to place love and mutual support for human flourishing at the center, it is clear that many same-sex couples would meet this standard. Hence their sexual acts would be morally just. There are, however, several objections that are made against this account of marriage as a central human good. One is that by placing procreation as the ‘natural fulfillment’ of marriage, sterile marriages are thereby denigrated. Sex in an opposite-sex marriage where the partners know that one or both of them are sterile is not done for procreation. Yet surely it is not wrong. Why, then, is homosexual sex in the same context (a long-term companionate union) wrong (Macedo, 1995)? The natural law rejoinder is that while vaginal intercourse is a potentially procreative sex act, considered in itself (though admitting the possibility that it may be impossible for a particular couple), oral and anal sex acts are never potentially procreative, whether heterosexual or homosexual (George, 1999). But is this biological distinction also morally relevant, and in the manner that natural law theorists assume? Natural law theorists, in their discussions of these issues, seem to waver. On the one hand, they want to defend an ideal of marriage as a loving union wherein two persons are committed to their mutual flourishing, and where sex is a complement to that ideal. Yet that opens the possibility of permissible gay sex, or heterosexual sodomy, both of which they want to oppose. So they then defend an account of sexuality which seems crudely reductive, emphasizing procreation to the point where literally a male orgasm anywhere except in the vagina of one's loving spouse is impermissible. Then, when accused of being reductive, they move back to the broader ideal of marriage. Natural law theory, at present, has made significant concessions to mainstream liberal thought. In contrast certainly to its medieval formulation, most contemporary natural law theorists argue for limited governmental power, and do not believe that the state has an interest in attempting to prevent all moral wrongdoing. Still, they do argue against homosexuality, and against legal protections for gays and lesbians in terms of employment and housing, even to the point of serving as expert witnesses in court cases or helping in the writing of amicus curae briefs. They also argue against same sex marriage (Bradley, 2001; George, 2001).

April 12, 2006 at 10:52 pm 4 comments

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